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The 57 countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference represent a very wide 
range of economic policies, performances and standards of living. They include 
countries that are amongst the poorest in the world (like Niger and Afghanistan), oil-
rich states with standards of living comparable to advanced industrialized countries 
(Kuwait, Qatar or Brunei), and middle-income industrialized and semi- industrialized 
countries (like Malaysia and Turkey). The variation in forms of political organization 
and types of cultures is at least as great. Yet there is a growing perception both within 
Islamic countries and in the outside world that these countries share some common 
features and that their prospects of economic development and social reform has 
something to do with these. It cannot be ruled out that the shared belief systems and 
perhaps even common features of the organization of religion have played a role in 
determining the contours of development in these countries. This possibility, in the 
contemporary context of the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’, has fed into an 
emerging Western consensus where Muslim countries are being urged to adopt 
reforms, and indeed their own internal reformers are urging reforms based on a 
particular reading of Western history and development experiences. This paper argues 
why some of the most widely accepted governance reforms that have emerged in the 
context of this debate might be very inappropriate for the development of Muslim 
countries. More seriously, these countries may be missing the opportunity to carry out 
reforms that can draw on their shared histories and cultures and make a difference to 
their growth trajectories and performance on issues of welfare and social justice.  
 
The contemporary debate about economic development and social justice in Muslim 
countries has been influenced by a particular reading of Western history and market 
economics that suggests that the prosperity of the West has been based on the 
expansion of economic, social and political freedoms that unleashed market forces 
and creativity. These social and political freedoms in particular, it is suggested, were 
at least in part based on a gradual separation of Church and state and a secularization 
of social life and in part on the spread of liberal democracy and individual freedoms. 
This view of Western history is very deeply rooted. It informs contemporary 
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judgements about the constraints facing Muslim countries, and the reform priorities 
that these countries must address. Since some of these features and in particular 
democracy and individual freedoms are desirable for their own sake, this reform 
agenda has many powerful supporters within the articulate political classes in Muslim 
countries. Moreover, like many deeply rooted beliefs, this analysis does have 
elements of truth, but we argue that the identification of areas of difference that 
purport to explain the rise of the West relative to the Islamic world misrepresents the 
challenges facing contemporary Muslim countries. These challenges and 
opportunities are defined by the experiences of late development in East Asia and 
elsewhere, which give a very different perspective on the social and political 
requirements of development and social justice in developing countries. 
Unfortunately, the reform priorities that are being identified by a growing body of 
social reformers in Muslim countries, for instance in the Arab Human Development 
Report 2004 (UNDP 2005) are overwhelmingly based on the good governance and 
free market perspectives that dominate the international policy discourse. Not only is 
this discourse impervious to recent historical experiences of development, it makes no 
effort to use already existing notions of justice and legitimacy (derived from Islam 
and other indigenous cultures) to fashion reform agendas for Islamic countries that are 
more likely to deliver results.  
 
Section 1 examines the conventional wisdom about the role of the reformation in the 
emergence of capitalism in Europe. This conventional view is based on a particular 
reading of a historical process but this reading is a contested one. Nevertheless, the 
conventional reading has provided a powerful inspiration for understanding the 
developmental constraints facing contemporary developing countries and in particular 
Islamic ones. Section 2 examines the powerful policy approach derived from 
contemporary institutional economics and political economy that identifies a series of 
‘good governance’ reforms that are claimed to be necessary preconditions for an 
economic takeoff. This analysis too is a contested one, but its main conclusions about 
the constraints facing developing countries has powerful resonances with the analysis 
of political, social and economic freedoms coming from the conventional reading of 
the role of the European Reformation. It is not surprising that a growing number of 
observers have combined the two approaches to talk about the ‘Economic Failure of 
Islam’. We argue that while many of the reforms suggested by these two parallel sets 
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of analyses enjoy widespread support, including from reform-minded intellectuals in 
Muslim developing countries, the theory and evidence of development does not 
support this expectation. From the perspective of the experience of rapid development 
in East Asia, there does not seem to be anything intrinsic in Islamic culture or history 
that precludes the mobilization of these societies for rapid development, and even for 
the rapid achievement of social justice. Nevertheless, Muslim countries are likely to 
face some common challenges in their attempt to construct states that can accelerate 
development with social justice, but they are not the challenges identified in the 
mainstream consensus. Nor are the underlying problems likely to be resolved by the 
approaches being supported by the international consensus on the reform priorities of 
developing countries, and in particular of Muslim ones. 
 
Section 3 argues that Islamic countries face some very different and country-specific 
challenges. First, far from the unification of ‘church’ and state being the problem, 
many Muslim countries often have to grapple with the consequences of the absence of 
a formal structure of organized religion. It is widely recognized that the institutional 
fragmentation of religion in Muslim countries is a problem for organizing social 
cohesion. This is not necessarily an insuperable problem provided appropriate 
institutions can be created with this objective in mind.  
 
A second problem that has increasingly emerged in some Muslim countries is a class 
divide between the state, together with emerging capitalists on the one hand, and 
religious leaders and preachers on the other. Given the professions and economic 
interests of the two sides, the class divide is often expressed in the form of an 
ideological struggle between Islam and the West. In Egypt, Algeria and increasingly 
in countries further afield, preachers from classes excluded from the benefits of 
growth have dominated the religious sphere and provided a powerful critique of the 
capitalist transformation. But their millenarian social and economic programme has 
often left little room for welfarist compromises. The unintended polarization between 
state and business elites identified with the ‘West’ and an indigenous and millenarian 
religious opposition is proving to be a powerful hurdle in the path of constructing 
coherent developmental states in many countries. This too is by no means an insoluble 
problem, but progress is not likely to be assisted by the types of strategies being 
promoted by mainstream analyses of the problem.  
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1. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism in the West 
A very widely held view in Western countries and increasingly amongst reformers in 
Muslim countries is that an Islamic Reformation has become necessary if economic 
and political progress is to be achieved in these countries. Nowhere is this more 
strongly expressed than in the Arab Human Development Report 2004, written by a 
broad collection of independent Arab social scientists (UNDP 2005). For obvious 
political reasons the authors prefer the term Arab renaissance to reformation, but it is 
clear that what they are advocating is a thoroughgoing reform of political rights to 
overcome what they describe as the deficit of freedom and governance in the Arab 
and Islamic world. The authors draw much of their analytical support from the work 
of Sen (1999) who defines development as the achievement of freedom.  But they also 
draw on a broader consensus that the economic development of the west was achieved 
through the gradual removal of ‘fetters’ on human creativity, freedom of movement, 
freedoms of belief and so on, that allowed free market capitalism to emerge. This 
view of deve lopment being unleashed by the removal of fetters comes not only from 
neoclassical economic historians but also from Marxist writers like Dobb (1946) and 
Sweezy (1950) who disagreed amongst themselves only about the mechanisms 
through which the fetters on development were removed during the transition to 
capitalism.  
 
An important part of this reading of history is that the Reformation in different 
European countries played a critical role in the economic modernization of the West. 
Religion created a critical set of constraints on beliefs and legitimated the social and 
economic power of institutions like the Church that held back initiative and 
constrained the re-allocation of resources. The Reformation initiated the process of 
separating church from state in Europe, and was instrumental in removing some of the 
fetters on economic and political freedoms that in turn allowed the rapid emergence of 
capitalism. In contrast, it is asserted in the new conventional wisdom that Islam not 
only had a more thorough interpenetration of religion with politics to start with, it also 
signally failed to initiate any process of separation. The absence of an Islamic 
reformation explains the relative underdevelopment of personal and social liberties in 
Islamic countries, and this in turn explains the economic lag between Islamic 
countries and the West, and even Islamic developing countries from non-Islamic ones. 
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It is from this perspective that Martin Wolf (2001) could confidently write about the 
‘Economic Failure of Islam’ by articulating this common view about the regressive 
relationship between religion and politics in Islam as opposed to the West. In some 
versions of this analysis, the failure of the Islamic Reformation has even deeper roots 
in Arab culture, psychology and philosophy (Said 1991). 
 
However, religion has a complex and contested role in explaining the emergence of 
capitalism in the West. Many influential and historically rooted analyses contradict 
the simple view that economic development either followed or was dependent on the 
ostensible secularization of politics achieved through the Reformation. Weber’s 
much-misunderstood analysis of Protestantism has often been presented by some neo-
Weberians as an argument that capitalism required a secularization of social life and 
that the Protestant revolution provided this. A more accurate reading of Weber is that 
he was concerned to trace the ideological roots of instrumental rationality in the 
organization of monastic life and in the tenets of Protestant teaching (Weber 1930; 
Collins 1986: 19-44). Far from religion having to be dislodged from the organization 
of social life to remove the ‘fetters’ it created, Weber was arguing that a particular 
religion played a critical role in setting the background conditions for the 
development of (for Weber) the most fundamental aspect of capitalism, namely the 
rational organization of economic life. If that was the contribution of the Protestant 
Reformation, Weber was probably wrong about the distinctiveness of Protestantism. 
The tenets and organizational practices of many religious traditions could be adapted 
to provide a similar basis for capitalism, as Maxime Rodinson powerfully argues in 
the case of Islam (Rodinson 1974: 76-117). The recent development of East Asia and 
the interest in the role of Confucianism also suggests that Protestantism is by no 
means unique in allowing the emergence of the instrumental rationality necessary for 
capitalism to flourish. 
 
But instrumental rationality and individual responsibility are only some of the 
conditions required for capitalism. The latter requires not just calculating individuals 
but also a system of property rights (that is inherently unequal in its distribution) and 
a stable social order. Michael Mann (1986) in his magisterial review of the sources of 
power in the rise of capitalism points out the role of Christianity in Europe as both an 
ideological system for constructing a cross-national social order as well as an 
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ideological system for legitimizing and justifying property rights even as they were 
becoming grossly unequal. From this perspective, economic takeoff did not have to 
await the removal of the fetters created by religion. Rather, the takeoff required the 
creation of a viable social order for economic development and religion played a part 
in the creation of this social order. Once again, the religious differences between 
Islam and the West appears to have less explanatory power since Islam played a very 
similar role in other parts of the world in establishing its own cross-national social 
order and in justifying property rights in much the same way as Christianity.  
 
However, the historical experience of the Reformation did point out some features 
that would be different from the experience of later development in Muslim countries. 
R.H. Tawney (1938) in his pioneering work on the European Reformation showed 
how, in what was to become the first industrial capitalist economy, the Reformation 
led to a strengthening of the relationship between Church and State. This is obvious in 
the ‘establishment’ of religion in England and a number of North European states as a 
direct consequence of the Reformation, a historical fact that runs counter to the 
popular story of secularization and separation. What is interesting is the degree of 
control that the Tudor state achieved over the Church, and the implications of this 
control for the resolution of some critical economic and administrative conflicts with 
the church. The distinctive feature of the relationship between Church and State in 
England that emerges from Tawney’s work was the ability of the Tudor state to 
impose its economic and administrative will on the Church while retaining its 
mobilizing powers for maintaining social order.  
 
The conflicts between modernizing monarchs in early modern Europe and the Church 
were very specific to the economic context. The most obvious economic conflict 
between monarchs and the Church was over the vast amounts of land owned by the 
Church. In the Middle Ages, the Church received over a quarter of all agricultural 
land revenues in England and in most of Europe (Mann 1986: 379). These assets not 
only reduced the access of the monarch to revenues but also created a powerful 
competing political force, often allied to Rome, which could prevent the centralization 
of political authority in the state. Secondly, there was a conflict between merchants 
and the Church over the theological acceptability of income from usury in 
Christianity. Here capitalist accumulation, which was driving productivity growth, did 
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face obstacles from a pre-capitalist Church-based system of maintaining social order 
using notions of justice that were no longer appropriate. Finally, there was a conflict 
between Church and state over their respective jurisdictions when it came to appoint 
officers to lucrative administrative and judicial positions. In this case, too, territorially 
defined emerging modern states faced competition from a parallel set of jurisdictions 
organized around the Church. Thus, the economic interests underlying the ideological 
conflict between Church and secular social forces were based on radically different 
ways of organizing production. In all these cases, the conflict between Church and 
state was settled decisively in favour of the state, but through a process that retained 
the role of the Church in maintaining social cohesion. 
 
Modernizing states in the contemporary Islamic world face very different issues from 
the ones facing Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The only common 
issue is usury, which is being tackled in a variety of ways in contemporary Muslim 
countries ranging from the careful definition of usury to the innovation of a number of 
innovative financial instruments based on profit sharing. Nevertheless, while the 
issues are different, the success of European states in resolving economic and political 
conflicts with the Church is very noteworthy. Of course, the Tudor success was not 
immediate and Tudor policies indirectly unleashed a civil war. But the existence of a 
Church hierarchy and the shared economic and political interests of this hierarchy 
with that of the state contributed to the eventual emergence of a resolution (with 
representatives of the church eventually sitting ex officio in parliament). In contrast to 
the English route, the French Revolution set out on what appeared to be an altogether 
more bloody and definitive rupture between church and state. The tasks of 
legitimization and the maintenance of social order were taken over, eventually, by the 
new state religion of republicanism. But in fact even in France the new state drew 
heavily on and maintained many aspects of the social order that had already been 
created by Catholicism (De Tocqueville 1998: 96-101).  
 
In the Islamic world too, the conflictual yet symbiotic relationship between religion as 
a source of social order and the economic and social agenda of modernizing states 
resulted in two types of responses that roughly parallel what we can describe as the 
English and French routes. In Pakistan in the sixties or in Malaysia today we find 
variants of the English route to ‘reformation’. In these and other Muslim countries, 
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states engaged with religious authorities to determine the interpretation of religious 
law and the limits of the jurisdiction of political and religious authorities. The 
economic and administrative issues were obviously not the same as in Tudor England, 
and in particular, control over land and administrative posts by religious endowments 
do not figure very much at all. However, other issues, in particular the determination 
of the boundaries of the legislative and judicial domains of state and religious 
authorities remains a key issue for social stability in many Islamic countries. Here, 
countries like Malaysia in particular have been quite successful, and Pakistan in the 
early sixties achieved significant progress in the interpretation of Islamic laws. 
Nevertheless, the absence of a hierarchy of religious office-holders and the rather 
large social divide between religious leaders and state elites in many Muslim 
countries often precluded thoroughgoing reform and the resolution of domains of 
competence. The important point here is about the institutional process through which 
compromises are reached and accommodation arrived at between pre-existing social 
norms and values and the adjustments that have to be continually made as the 
organization of society changes. If the interpretation of these norms is coming from a 
group of religious leaders with whom the leaders of the state share very little, and who 
also have a very limited understanding of the economic and social challenges facing 
their society, accommodation and compromise is less likely. We will return to this 
question later.  
 
In contrast, Turkey represents features of the French route but without the protracted 
(and bloody) social revolution that accompanied it. Perhaps because of that, this route 
too has had limited success in the resolution of the role of religion in the Muslim 
societies that have tried it. The exclusion of religion from public life in Turkey 
appears to have been very effective, but in fact, the separation of religion from public 
life remains strongly contested from below almost a century after Ataturk’s reforms. 
Nor is it clear that the secular institutions of Turkey enjoy very wide legitimacy as the 
institutions that can enforce shared social norms and values. Given the limited 
likelihood of the French route being successfully attempted anew in a further range of 
contemporary Muslim countries, the simplistic argument for reformation could be 
turned on its head in the light of a more accurate examination of European and 
Islamic history. The relevant question for Muslim countries is perhaps not how to 
increase the distance between religion and the state, but rather how to diminish it so 
 9 
that modernizing Muslim states can set the limits to the legislative and judicial 
competence of religious authorities in ways that allow economic development with 
social justice to be accelerated.  
 
2. Good Governance and the Preconditions for Development 
Even more than the conventional wisdom on the separation of church and state in 
Europe, the new consensus on good governance as a set of institutional requirements 
for development has informed the new consensus on the reform priorities facing 
Islamic countries. Good governance is a broad set of governance goals that are 
desirable in themselves, but modern political economy has elevated many of these 
goals of development into necessary means for achieving development. These 
governance goals include achieving stable property rights, the rule of law, the 
accountability of public officials, the absence of corruption and multi-party 
democracy. These governance goals now have a body of theory and evidence arguing 
that they are necessary preconditions for economic and social development in 
developing countries (North 1990; Knack and Keefer 1995, 1997; Olson 1997; Hall 
and Jones 1999; Kauffman, et al. 1999; Olson 2000; Bates 2001). A full discussion of 
the economic theory and the interpretation of the evidence on which these arguments 
are based would take us too far away from the subject of our discussion. But the 
essential argument is very similar to the ‘removal of fetters’ logic that we have 
already come across.  
 
Competitive markets create necessary and sufficient conditions for economic growth 
by creating incentives and opportunities for the application of creativity, resources 
and effort in the most profitable areas. But for markets to be efficient, states have to 
desist from disrupting the level playing field by creating artificial incomes in the form 
of subsidies, monopoly incomes and other artificial incomes or ‘rents’. Rents destroy 
the incentives for productive activities because they create incentives for unproductive 
rent-seeking activities where individuals spend resources and effort in trying to 
influence the state to allocate rents to them. The state then becomes clientelist and 
corrupt, responding to special interests that can pay or mobilize politically to capture 
rents. Corruption not only corrodes the public order; as a form of rent seeking that 
creates rents, it also undermines economic efficiency and growth. The drivers of 
market disruption are therefore rent seeking and corruption. These processes damage 
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the majority and in turn only persist because small groups of individuals can 
monopolize access to political power. An important part of the reform strategy (apart 
from direct attacks on corruption and the liberalization of markets) is therefore to 
promote democratization to challenge the monopolization of power. Democratization, 
it is claimed though not necessarily correctly, is essential for preventing rent seeking, 
stabilizing property rights and ensuring a level playing field in the market. The 
interdependence of these reforms explains why good governance reformers insist that 
partial reforms will not work and a multi-pronged reform effort is required, pushing 
liberalization, rule of law and judicial reforms, anti-corruption strategies and 
democratization simultaneously (Khan 2004). 
 
The evidence in support of these propositions comes from the observation that 
advanced countries generally tend to have most of the characteristics that good 
governance theories predict. This is not strictly true as all societies including the most 
advanced have significant rent-seeking activities. Nevertheless, advanced countries do 
have a much bigger share of their rent seeking in the form of legal rent seeking as 
opposed to corruption. On average, advanced countries have lower corruption, more 
stable property rights, better scores on rule of law and are more democratic. But 
despite the apparent statistical fit, there are serious questions about the causality 
behind these observations. Did advanced countries start to develop because they first 
acquired good governance characteristics, or did they acquire these governance 
characteristics after they achieved high per capita incomes? The remarkable 
experience of the high-growth Asian countries in the last half of the twentieth century 
suggests that it was the latter. This is particularly true when we look at the conditions 
required for making democracy sustainable across developing countries. This 
evidence suggests that democratization tends to be much more sustainable if the 
country attempting democratization is already rich (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; 
Przeworski, et al. 2000). If so, Muslim countries seeking to achieve good governance 
characteristics by prioritizing democratization are taking on a task that is eventually 
very likely to fail. They should rather have looked at the governance characteristics of 
rapidly growing countries, and tried to understand how these characteristics 
accelerated the development process in these countries. Indeed, in terms of good 
governance characteristics, most of the high-growth East Asian economies would 
have failed the test of good governance just as much as many of the laggards. 
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Regardless of the confidence with which we can accept the causal mechanisms 
between good governance characteristics and development, the literature has offered 
no particular reasons to suggest that Muslim countries would perform worse in terms 
of these characteristics. The only exception is democracy, where Islam, together with 
Confucianism and Catholicism has been identified in much of the social science 
literature as being inimical to democracy (Gellner 1991: 506; Lewis 1993: 96-8). The 
argument is typically a flimsy one about the balance between individual and collective 
rights and responsibilities in different traditions. Weber is often invoked in these 
arguments but without reference to what he actually wrote. This is not surprising as 
Weber’s argument was about the sources of rationality in Protestantism, and not about 
its support for specific political institutions. Since in terms of the logic of good 
governance democracy is the linchpin that ensures that rent seeking is controlled and 
efficient markets and stable property rights are maintained it is important to know 
what the evidence on democracy across developing countries actually tells us. This is 
particularly important given that opinion-makers like Wolf (2001) and many others 
frequently indulge in crude head counts of developing countries to prove that Muslim 
countries fail the democracy test. In a detailed study of 141 countries over the period 
1950-1990, Przeworski et al. (2000) test the hypothesis that Protestantism was more 
conducive to the emergence or longevity of democracies compared to Catholicism or 
Islam. Their conclusion is worth quoting in full:  
According to our analysis, none of these assertions can withstand 
scrutiny. Indeed, the only effect of religion that emerges from the 
statistical examination is that democracies are more likely to survive in 
countries in which there are more Catholics. Neither Protestantism nor 
Islam seems to have an effect on the emergence or the durability of 
democracy (Przeworski, et al. 2000: 126). 
 
Thus, despite the concern with democratization in Muslim countries (including in the 
Arab Human Development Report referred to earlier), they do not seem to have any 
particular constraints over and above the general constraints on the operation of viable 
and sustained democracies in poor countries. But more importantly, the experience of 
rapid development in East Asia tells us that the governance characteristics identified 
in the good governance approach may not be the most critical ones that developing 
countries have to try and acquire for accelerating economic and social development.  
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In sharp contrast to the good governance approach, an extensive alternative literature 
argues that the success of East Asia was based on significantly different state 
capacities even if the details varied widely across these countries (some of this 
literature is surveyed in Khan 2004). The roots of the debate between good 
governance and ‘transformation’ approaches to development go back to the argument 
that we came across earlier, according to which capitalism emerged in Europe when 
the fetters on thinking freely and the fetters on the movement of goods and people 
began to weaken. This perspective  on the development of modern Europe is shared by 
strands within both Marxist and neoclassical economics and economic history. In 
contrast, Wood (2002), drawing on the earlier work of Brenner (1976; 1985) and 
others argued that markets as systems of exchange that created opportunities for trade 
had existed for centuries without the transformation of production taking off in the 
way that it did in English agriculture and industry following the enclosures and the 
expansion of English maritime power. The key that is relevant for our examination of 
the contemporary context is that the opportunities and incentives created by freedom 
are often insufficient for rapid social transformations.  
 
Sharp breaks in growth paths have typically been associated with the emergence of 
new institutional arrangements that create compulsions and not just incentives for new 
ways of doing things. Compulsions could be predominantly market compulsions, as 
was the case for workers and capitalists in early English capitalism (at least after the 
primitive accumulation period was over). Or they could be some combination of 
market and state compulsion as has more typically been the case in late developers 
where land, infrastructure, natural resources and public subsidies have been 
prioritized for emerging capitalists but subjected to different forms of discipline to 
ensure productivity growth. When they are happening, these painful and often deeply 
contested social transformations cannot accurately be characterized as predominantly 
emancipatory processes where fetters are being removed and latent potential is being 
unleashed. However, if the transformation is successful and social productivity 
increases, it would be quite possible later on to write a history of the transformation as 
a process of voluntary change. If everyone’s productivity increased and most or even 
all individuals benefited in the end, it would be at least credible if not entirely 
historically accurate to claim that everyone had really wanted the transformation and 
freedom helped them to collectively drive social change in a positive direction. In 
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fact, the process may actually have been quite different, with many perhaps most 
perceiving the process as one of market and state-driven compulsion. The two 
narratives have very different implications for the kinds of state powers and capacities 
that are likely to prove effective during processes of transformation.  
 
The experience of East Asia directs our attention to at least three processes where 
state governance capacities were important in ensuring developmental outcomes. The 
first is in the restructuring of property rights that accompanies any rapid capitalist 
transformation where new classes of capitalists emerge to control blocks of 
productive assets producing for profit in the market. This process of restructuring of 
asset ownership, which Marx described as primitive accumulation, is nowadays rarely 
driven by the outright theft of land and resources that characterized the early 
developers (though that still happens too). Instead, states have to manage a more 
subtle process of land allocation priorities, infrastructure prioritization and other 
measures to accelerate the emergence of blocks of assets that have the minimum 
efficient scale to survive against international competition. Whatever the eventual 
outcome of these strategies in terms of social productivity, the immediate reality is 
one of winners and losers, of opportunities and compulsions. States that did not have 
the capacity to manage these processes have enjoyed much slower progress. 
 
Second, and perhaps even more important, states have assisted their emerging 
capitalists to catch up with international productivity through many different 
measures. These have included outright subsidies conditional on performance (South 
Korea), technology licensing and subcontracting of technologies (Taiwan), joint 
ventures between public sector high-technology industries and multinational 
companies (Malaysia), infrastructure prioritization for multinationals with 
requirements of subcontracting to local manufacturers (Malaysia) and other variants. 
Each of these strategies has required appropriate disciplining capabilities of the state 
such that the assistance emerging capitalists were receiving was not entirely wasted. 
Here is yet another component of compulsion, this time affecting emerging capitalists 
and managers. If state governance capacities fail to enforce discipline on emerging 
capitalists it is likely that they will not exert themselves to the maximum degree. In 
extreme cases, subsidies may be wasted, domestic markets may be monopolized by 
inefficient companies and broader support for the strategy may rapidly ebb away.  
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Finally, states in late developers could only succeed if they were able to provide 
social cohesion through redistributions of income and wealth in line with economic 
opportunities and social demands. Of the East Asian developers, South Korea and 
Taiwan were very untypical in having internal political structures that did not require 
much income redistribution for maintaining political stability once early land reform 
had been achieved. In contrast, Malaysia was a much more typical ex-colony with a 
powerful indigenous intermediate class whose political aspirations had to be met with 
internal redistribution strategies. These strategies were very successful in achieving 
social stability during a difficult transition period. In many other developing 
countries, Islamic or otherwise, emerging states often failed to achieve political 
stability despite substantial internal redistribution to powerful groups. Moreover, 
redistributive agendas also disrupted the state’s ability to discipline the allocation of 
subsidies for catching up in these countries.  
 
From this perspective, the focus on freedom and the opportunities of markets may not 
bode well for developing countries that have yet to construct dynamic productive 
sectors. Freedom in particular is clearly an important goal for individuals and for 
society but greater freedom, on its own, is unlikely to ensure change in the direction 
of more productive economies in the way that good governance theories assert. 
Developing countries face the challenge of constructing governance capacities of 
states that can allow and even accelerate the emergence of a class of capitalists and 
provide them with the resources they need to acquire technologies that enable them to 
become internationally competitive. At the same time, states need to be able impose 
discipline on emerging capitalists through market and non-market mechanisms to 
ensure that these privileges are not wasted, and productivity growth is rapid enough to 
be sustain broad based redistribution programmes to ensure social justice as well as 
political stability.  
 
These are challenges that all developing countries face. Many of the most important 
constraints facing the construction of developmental states of this type comes from 
the power of organized intermediate/middle class groups who are most able to 
organize resistance to attempts to impose disciplinary compulsions that affect them. 
The strength of this resistance is likely to depend much more on the history of social 
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organization in different societies, the organizational structures of the intermediate 
classes, their links with and organizational hold over other classes and groups and so 
on, rather than with their religion (Kohli 1994; Khan 2000). Thus, it is not at all clear 
why Islamic countries should face any more sustained challenges in constructing 
developmental states of this type. Nevertheless, in the next section, we will look at 
some features of Islamic societies that may create some common challenges and 
opportunities. But we argue that these are rather different from the reforms of religion 
and the state that Muslim societies are being asked to confront.  
 
3. Challenges for Muslim Countries 
On the face of it, the very strong notions of justice and discipline embedded in Islamic 
culture (even though it varies considerably across the Islamic world) should have 
helped emerging developmental states in the Muslim world combine disciplined 
support for emerging capitalism with a redistributive social agenda sufficient to 
maintain social solidarity and stability. But features of the institutional and political 
organization of religion in some Muslim countries may also make developmental 
transformations more difficult. I will raise two separate questions as topics for further 
research and discussion.  
 
First, far from the non-separation of ‘church’ and state in Islamic countries being the 
problem, many Muslim countries, and in particular Sunni Muslim ones often have had 
to grapple with the absence of a formal structure of organized religion. As religion has 
been a powerful mobilizing force in most Muslim societies in times of stressful social 
changes, the absence of a church that could be influenced by the state has hampered 
the construction of social cohesion in many cases. The fragmentation of the 
institutional structure has meant that one way of mobilizing different preachers and 
their followers has often been through the organization of campaigns of purification, 
very often targeting outsiders or minority sects. Good examples of this are provided 
by the history of religious mobilizations in Pakistan and Bangladesh where attempts 
to construct social cohesion have often degenerated into campaigns against minority 
sects like the Sh'ia or the Ahmadiyas. There are many parallels here with the Puritan 
sectarianism that ravaged England in the years before the established church was 
properly organized. This purely institutional problem is not an insuperable one 
provided appropriate institutions could be created with this objective in mind. Of 
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course, an established church along the English model would not at all be feasible in 
Islam, which formally rejects (at least in its Sunni version) a hierarchy of clergy. 
Nevertheless, there is a parallel tradition of the ruler imposing discipline on the 
mosques through a number of mechanisms including the sanctioning of the Friday 
khutba or sermon. In countries like Saudi Arabia, these institutions have been used to 
impose a draconian uniformity on religion. Many Muslim countries happily operate 
somewhere in the middle. The institutional issue, though potentially serious, would 
not have been a persistent problem on its own were it not for the next issue tha t we 
will discuss.  
 
A second and more intractable problem for the relationship between religion and the 
state in many Muslim countries is a political one that has intensified in the last fifty 
years. This is essentially a class divide between the state and emerging capitalists on 
the one hand and religious leaders and preachers on the other. The roots of this 
problem go back to the absence of well-endowed churches in Islam. Related to this 
material fact was the obvious reluctance of members of the ruling classes to make 
preaching or the organization of religion their profession. There were exceptions, of 
course, but there was nothing like the European tradition of second and third sons of 
the aristocracy joining the church. Religious leaders in Muslim countries most often 
came from very poor backgrounds and were often poorly educated in subjects outside 
their limited knowledge of religious texts. Religious waqfs or endowments set up by 
the rich as acts of piety provided these preachers a meagre living but no t much more.  
 
Preachers in many Muslim countries were therefore at best likely to come from the 
lower middle classes. Later, when these countries began their attempts at 
industrialization and modernization in the post-colonial period, the class of preachers 
and clerics discovered that the social classes that they came from were often the very 
ones that were largely excluded from the immediate benefits of capitalist growth. 
Their critique of some of the manifestations of the capitalist transformation, such as 
corruption, the concentration of power and the loosening of moral codes was not 
surprisingly often very powerful. But their political and economic alternatives could 
not but be millenarian ones given their training and background. In Egypt, Algeria, 
and increasingly in many other Muslim countries, these millenarian goals began to be 
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defined in terms of a conflict between the decadence and corruption of the West and 
the purity of the spaces of Islam.  
 
Many developing country states ran into trouble maintaining the pace of economic 
growth in the sixties and seventies. But in some Muslim countries, the economic, 
social and political gap between the business and state elite on the one hand and the 
religious leaders on the other who could easily mobilize mass constituencies, created 
conditions that could rapidly degenerate into political crises. This was by no means 
always the case, and indeed, in the more successful Muslim countries the gap was 
bridged to a greater or lesser extent. But millenarian social and economic programmes 
often left little room for welfarist compromises. An unintended polarization began to 
emerge between state and business elites who began to be identified with the ‘West’ 
and an indigenous and millenarian religious opposition. The legacy of this 
polarization is proving to be a powerful hurdle in the path of constructing coherent 
developmental states in many Muslim countries.  
 
Ironically, at the same time the West was doing its best to undermine the 
developmental agendas of these countries through a series of ideologically motivated 
policy interventions, ranging from structural adjustment to good governance reforms. 
These reforms increasingly associated the leadership of the state with Western aid and 
influence while dooming them to a high likelihood of economic failure. The 
consequence was that while these oppositional religious movements did not have any 
political or economic programmes of their own, they could nevertheless enter the 
domain of politics because the bankruptcy of some deve lopmental states in the 
Muslim world was becoming increasingly obvious. The growing incursion of an 
oppositional religious discourse in the politics of many developing countries often 
made matters worse by making transparent the growing political alienation of the 
rulers from the ruled. The declining legitimacy of the state leadership in countries as 
different as Egypt and Pakistan further undermined any hope this leadership may have 
had of constructing institutions that could accelerate social transformations by being 
able to maintain and enhance social discipline. In the worst-case scenario, these 
tendencies can set off mutually reinforcing feedbacks that continue to deepen the 
polarization of society till the existing state machinery becomes unviable. The  
economic impasse as states fail to accelerate development can lead to the legitimacy 
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of state leaders declining, this can lead to an even lower likelihood of constructing a 
developmental state and this in turn can attract increasingly inappropriate Western 
advice and policy priorities, now with conditionalities that can be imposed on 
countries descending into economic crisis. And so the cycle can continue.  
 
The response to this problem is clearly not the rapid implementation of good 
governance reforms or a forced implementation of an Islamic Reformation. Neither of 
these responses would address the roots of the problem and each may actually make 
the internal fragmentation of some Muslim countries much worse. A viable response 
would have to take into account country-specific details, but would be likely to 
include a number of elements. A pragmatic programme of enhancing economic 
productivity and production has to be the cornerstone of any programme of viable 
transformation. This requires going beyond, if not abandoning the good governance 
agenda and developing an alternative set of reform priorities appropriate for the 
country in question. Note that this does not mean authoritarianism or the suppression 
of human rights or anything so absurd, but it does mean identifying reform priorities 
for enhancing governance capacities in critical areas, and these may be very different 
priorities from good governance ones. The change in priorities is critical because 
economic viability is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for maintaining the 
legitimacy of any state. Democracy, the fight against corruption, improvements in the 
rule of law and other good governance goals should remain goals for all societies. But 
to believe that these reforms are the most important priority because they will unleash 
social and economic development in the way that has been argued could prove to be a 
dangerous mistake. 
 
If this rethinking of reform priorities could be achieved with the participation of the 
opposition, including the Islamist opposition, the problem of the declining legitimacy 
of some Muslim states could also be addressed. State leaderships in Muslim countries 
like Egypt, Jordan or Algeria (and increasingly other countries like Pakistan) are 
losing legitimacy not because they are pro-Western but primarily because they are 
failing to provide rapid and sustained improvements in living standards. The popular 
opposition to state policies in many Muslim countries can potentially be overcome by 
combining disciplined institutions of social transformation with rapid and significant 
redistributions of assets and incomes to achieve feasible improvements in social 
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justice. None of this is technically impossible even though some of these reforms 
would be politically very difficult to achieve. Paradoxically, the mobilization of 
popular forces in favour of justice and against the domination of the west, one of the 
achievements of the popular Islamist oppositions in many developing countries, may 
actually make the creation of new developmental coalitions possible in the future. But 
for that to happen, we must first agree on what the problem is and how best to proceed 
with solving it. 
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